Knowing God (1) – Individual and Universal Knowledge of God

In the Name of God

(1) – What follows is the representation and exposition of the first part of the book Khudāshenāsī (Theology), which constitutes the first volume of the thematic exegesis entitled Ma’āref-e Qur’ān (Teachings of the Qur’an), authored by ʿAllāmah Miṣbāḥ Yazdī. (Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Ma‘ārif-e Qur’ān: Khudā-shināsī, Kiyhān-shināsī, Insān-shināsī, 1391, pp. 29–30.) Before beginning his discussion on the knowledge of God in the Qur’an, he offers, as a preface, some remarks on certain types of knowledge and applies them to the knowledge of God.

I. Types of Knowledge

(2) – (On individual knowledge and universal knowledge) “Knowledge concerning an existent, depending on the object of that knowledge, occurs in two ways: one is individual (shakhṣī) knowledge, and the other is universal (kullī) knowledge”. Both of these forms of knowledge, in reality, can pertain to one existent, yet that existent is known in two different ways. In individual knowledge, the existent is known with its individuation (tashakhkhuṣ), whereas in universal knowledge, that same existent is known only as “one of the instances of a universal”.

If, concerning an individuated existent, we only know that it is a human, then in fact we have known it merely as one of the instances of “human”, not as a specific, determinate existent distinguished from all other individuated existents. Of course, in universal knowledge, a kind of differentiation and determination is also obtained, for this existent is known as an instance of “human,” meaning it is not an instance of some other universal (say “cow”), and thus it is differentiated from the instances of those other universals. However, this differentiation is, in reality, between universals—or, better put, it is a differentiation between the forms, limits, and modes of existents—not a differentiation between the existents themselves qua individuated and determinate entities.

But when, for example, we see a fire with our own eyes (as opposed to the case in which we establish by rational inference the existence of a fire somewhere—because we see smoke there, and thus conclude that there must be a fire there), we have known that very specific fire itself, not merely as one of the instances of the universal “fire.” It must be noted, however, that when we have only universal knowledge of a thing, we also know that its instances must in any case possess individuation (tashakhkhuṣ), since every existent is individuated. Yet even this knowledge is itself universal, and it differs from the knowledge obtained by directly seeing that specific fire, since by seeing, we know that particular fire itself, not merely that “the instance of fire (whose existence we have established by inference) has an individuation.” In technical terms, in individual knowledge, the individual thing is known qua particular (bimā huwa khāṣṣ), whereas in universal knowledge, that same thing is known qua fire, or qua human, and so forth.

It can be said that in individual knowledge, a person in fact has a direct cognitive encounter with the object; whereas in universal knowledge, no such direct encounter takes place; rather, for example, through reasoning, the instantiation of a universal concept in the external world is established, without there being a direct encounter with that particular instance. In other words, universal knowledge is a kind of knowledge in absence.

(3) – (Intellect as a means to universal knowledge) “Universal knowledge with respect to all existents is obtained through intellectual concepts (mafāhīm ʿaqliyyah). This kind of knowledge in reality pertains to the māhiyyāt (quiddities) and universal designations of existents, and only in an indirect (metaphorical) manner (bil-ʿaraḍ) is it attributed to individuals and particular instances.”

“For example, knowing Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, Taqī, and Naqī as “human beings”—that is, as living beings possessing the capacity for rational thought and other human characteristics—is a universal knowledge which, principally (bil-aṣālah), pertains to the māhiyyah (quiddity) “human” and only bil-ʿaraḍ (indirectly) is it attributed to Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, and so on. Likewise, knowing “electricity” as a kind of energy that can be transformed into light and heat and that causes many physical phenomena is also a universal knowledge, which bil-aṣālah pertains to a universal designation and bil-ʿaraḍ is attributed to a particular instance of electricity.”

In other words, when we have known an individual (such as Ḥasan) only as a “human being”, what we have actually come to know is the existence of an instance of humanity—that is, this knowledge truly pertains to Ḥasan’s humanity alone, and to nothing else. And since his being “Ḥasan” is not solely due to his humanity, this universal knowledge in reality does not truly pertain to Ḥasan as such; rather, it truly pertains only to his humanity, and it is only metaphorically attributed to him.

(4) – (Sensory perception as a means to individual knowledge) “Individual knowledge with respect to sensory things is obtained through the senses, in the form of sensory perception”. That is, the direct cognitive encounter, in the case of some of the existents known by a human being, occurs when the sensory faculty establishes contact with these things and a sensory mental phenomenon comes into existence. When we look at the green table, the image that comes into being due to the contact of that table with the sensory faculty of sight, in fact, represents that very table, not something else. It is true that at that very moment the universal “green” and the universal “table” might be abstracted from that encounter, or that these universal concepts may already have been present in the mind, and thus the universal concept “green table” is formed and applied to that same table—but this universal concept is not indicative of any particular table. By contrast, the image that is the direct product of seeing indicates only that determinate existent, and nothing else.

Obviously, as has been pointed out, this tool of sensory knowledge applies only to those existents with which the human sensory apparatus can establish sensory contact—that is, sensory existents—and for non-sensory existents, this tool has no efficacy in producing individual knowledge. Thus, if God could be known through individual knowledge, it would not be through sense perception.

(5) – (Knowledge by presence, another means to individual knowledge) “In the case of non-sensory things, individual knowledge is possible only in the form of knowledge by presence (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī) and shuhūdī knowledge”. In other words, that direct cognitive encounter which is necessary for attaining individual knowledge—in the case of immaterial and non-sensory existents—can occur only when the known (maʿlūm) is present (ḥāḍir) to the knower (ʿālim). In this kind of knowledge, no concept serves as an intermediary; rather, the known itself is present to the knower, and an immediate and direct knowledge comes to pass because the characteristic property of conscious beings is that they are cognitively sensitive towards anything that comes into existential contact with them.

Even the acquired knowledge in which conscious beings know something through mental concepts (as opposed to presential knowledge), is a result of such direct connection because when we know something through mental phenomena, we are existentially connected to them, and it is this connection and the characteristic cognitive sensitivity that brings about a presential knowledge with respect to the mental concept through which we become aware of the object shown by that concept. So, in a manner of speaking, all the knowledge we have is presential knowledge and when the object of such a knowledge is a mental phenomenon, we call it acquired knowledge.

In the same way that sense-perception is the way for acquiring sensory knowledge, shuhūd is the way of acquiring knowledge by presence, i.e., when you acquire knowledge about something through shuhūd, you have presential knowledge about that thing. “For example, a person’s awareness of their own self (= the “I” that perceives) and of their inner faculties, as well as of their mental acts and states such as volition and love, is individual and by presence”.

II. Types of Knowledge of God

(6) – (On universal knowledge concerning God) “The kinds of knowledge obtained through rational demonstrations (barāhīn ʿaqliyyah) are all universal and acquired (ḥuṣūlī) knowledge, mediated by mental concepts.” For example, when by the proof of Necessary Existent we establish that the Necessary Existent (wājib al-wujūd) exists, what we have in fact established is that the concept “Necessary Existent” has an instance, but we have not directly known that instance itself. It is true that when, by another demonstration, we establish that it is impossible for the Necessary Existent to be more than one, we have thereby known that there is only a single instance of the Necessary Existent, and every attribute we prove universally for the Necessary Existent will pertain to that one individual. Yet even so, we do not have individual knowledge of the instance of the Necessary Existent; we merely know that this concept has no second instance.

In other words, through the proofs of existence of God, we only acquire knowledge about God as a necessary existent, or a first cause, or an intelligent designer, etc., not as that exact individual and determinate existent that God is. In other words, we know Him in absence. We acquire a knowledge of Him without having a direct encounter with Him. This may be what the tradition narrated from Imām al-Ṣādiq (ʿa) means:

“Whoever thinks that He (Allah) is worshipped by (knowing) the attribute rather than by idrāk has referred to an absent one… Indeed, knowledge of the essence of the present (the present itself) precedes its attribute, and knowledge of the attribute of the absent precedes its essence (itself).” (Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, 1404 A.H., p. 326.)

Idrāk (ادراک) is employed sometimes to signify knowledge in general, just like ‘ilm, but its other usage, perhaps the original one, is employed to mean reaching the utmost point of something and catching up with something, as in أدرك الصبيّ → the boy reached puberty (end of childhood) or أدركه الغرق → the drowning overtook him/ he was overcome by drowning (see: Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, 1412 A.H., p. 311). Thus, when it is used to mean knowledge, it would more accurately correspond to the most intimate form of knowledge, which is tantamount to attaining, reaching, and grasping the object of knowledge, i.e., perhaps, the direct cognitive contact. Therefore, when there are contextual and other (e.g., intellectual, such as has been laid out in this article) indicators (which, precisely, is the case here), one can easily recognize that either the usage signifying ‘knowledge in general’ is not being employed, or that idrāk here means knowledge in general, but because it is used as the case opposite to knowing God through attributes, it can be understood that by idrāk of God, the intended meaning is the kind of knowledge which is not through any universals. (See no.9).

(7) – (On individual knowledge of God) If God is known by the way of shuhūd, then the resultant knowledge of God will be both knowledge by presence and individual knowledge. Can God be so known? As was indicated above (no.5), for the knower to know something through presential knowledge, the known ought to be present to the knower. This presence is a result of a direct existential (ontological) relation. One of the most intimate of such relationships is found between the efficient cause that bestows existence and its effect. And because God is the cause that bestows existence upon everything other than God (mā siwā Allāh), this mutual presence between the creature and God will also be realised. Therefore, beings endowed with consciousness—such as human beings—can have (or actually have) knowledge by presence with respect to God.

But, “not all instances of ʿilm ḥuḍūrī are equal in intensity; sometimes this knowledge by presence is strong and vivid enough to occur in a fully conscious form, while at other times it is weak and faint, occurring in a semi-conscious or even unconscious form” (Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Āmūzesh-e Falsafeh, vol. 1, 1391, p. 172). Thus, this ʿilm ḥuḍūrī towards God is not equally intense in all human beings. “Due to the weakness of one’s existential degree and also due to attention being directed toward the body and material concerns, this knowledge takes on an unconscious form. But with the perfection of the soul, the reduction of attention to the body and material affairs, and the strengthening of the heart’s attention toward God Most High, that same knowledge attains levels of clarity and conscious awareness.” (Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Āmūzesh-e Falsafeh, vol. 1, 1391, p. 173)

(8) – (A note about knowledge by presence) “Knowledge by presence is not teachable or learnable, because teaching and learning occur through words and concepts, which bring specific meanings into the mind of the hearer or thinker, whereas ʿilm ḥuḍūrī is not of the kind of mental meanings and cannot be transferred to another person. Even Qur’anic statements themselves cannot, of their own accord, give us ʿilm ḥuḍūrī or shuhūdī knowledge; rather, they can show us a path by which we may acquire shuhūdī knowledge of God the Most High, or bring unconscious or semi-conscious knowledge to the level of full awareness.” Such a path will constitute something that, based on what was said in no.7, results in the severance of a person’s attention from other things and it being focused upon the Creator, with whom the person has a deep existential connection. This state of perfection and attention towards God is referred to with expressions such as “proximity to God” (qurb ilā Allāh) and the like.

(9) – (A brief note on the implications of attending to this distinction) “Attending to this point protects our minds from prejudging verses concerning the knowledge of God, stops us from uncritically interpreting all of them as referring to universal and rational knowledge, and prompts us to examine their perspective more carefully. Some of them may, perhaps, pertain to the heart’s shuhūdī relationship with God, which occurs in a semi-conscious or conscious form and is of the kind of shuhūdī and ʿilm ḥuḍūrī that is individual (shakhṣī). Perhaps the “prior vision” (ruʾyat-e qablī) to which some verses and narrations allude is precisely this shuhūdī knowledge.  And perhaps the statement that “God must be known through Himself, not through His creatures” refers to such knowledge. Many other contents found in certain narrations may also point to this“, such as the narration presented in no.6.

Bibliography

1. Ibn Shu‘bah al-Ḥarrānī, Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī. 1404 A.H. Tuḥaf al-‘Uqūl. Qum: Jāmi‘ah-yi Mudarrisīn.
2. Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad. 1412 A.H. Mufradāt Alfāẓ al-Qur’ān. Vol. 1. Beirut: Dār al-Shāmiyyah.
3. Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, Muḥammad Taqī. 1391. Āmūzesh-e Falsafeh, vol. 1. Qum: Intishārāt-e Mu’assasah-ye Āmūzishī va Pizhūhishī-ye Imām Khomeinī (quddisa sirruh).
4. ———. 1391. Ma‘ārif-e Qur’ān: Khudā-shināsī, Kiyhān-shināsī, Insān-shināsī. Qum: Intishārāt-e Mu’assasah-ye Āmūzishī va Pizhūhishī-ye Imām Khomeinī (quddisa sirruh).